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Abstract
Measuring the vulnerability of communities in complex network has become
an important topic in the research of complex system. Numerous existing
vulnerability measures have been proposed to solve such problems, however,
most of these methods have their own shortcomings and limitations. There-
fore, a new entropy-based approach is proposed in this paper to address such
problems. This measure combines the internal factors and external factors
for each communities which can give the quantitative description of vulner-
ability of community. The internal factors contain the complexity degree of
community and the number of edges inside the community, and the external
factors contain the similarity degree between chosen community and other
communities and the number of nodes outside the community. Consider-
ing community vulnerability from the perspective of entropy provides a new
solution to such problem. Due to sufficient consideration of community in-
formation, more reasonable vulnerability result can be obtained. In order to
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show the performance and effectiveness of this proposed method, one exam-
ple network and three real-world complex network is used to compare with
some exiting methods, and the sensitivity of weight factors is analysed by
Sobol’ indices. The experiment results demonstrate the reasonableness and
superiority of this proposed method.
Keywords: Complex network, Community vulnerability, Entropy
1. Introduction
Recently, cyber-physical system (CPS) has attracted much attention in nu-
merous fields, such as microgrid [1], smart city [2], internet of things [3, 4],
and so on. Meanwhile, how to model CPS into specific physical models to
analyze their performance and property has become the focus of research [5].
Therefore, complex network has been applied in this field to better under-
stand the performance of CPS [6, 7], because nodes in the network represent
individuals in the system, and edges would show the relationship between
these individuals. Most of previous researches focus on the structure and
topological property, which can quantify the characteristic and performance
of network. Particularly, the community structure has received increasing
attention, because it can reveal human dynamics [8, 9], inference reliable
links [10], and identify influential nodes [11, 12]. The community structure
in the network demonstrates a higher density of nodes and edges, which can
cause critical influence on the function and structure of subnetwork, improve
the reliability of system [13, 14], and counteract the aging effect [15, 16].
There are several different problems about the research of community struc-
ture, which can be divided into two issues. The first one is about the struc-
ture of community, such as dividing network’s community structure [17–19],
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detecting overlapping community [20], and dynamic changes of community
in evolving network [21]. Another one is the property of community, in-
cluding measuring the reliance of community [22–24], reconfiguring network
[25], quantifying the reliability of community[26, 27], and measuring commu-
nity vulnerability [28]. The vulnerability of community in network gradually
aroused researchers’ interest recently. For example, Rocco et al. [29] defined
vulnerability set and value for different community, and proposed relative
vulnerability value to compare with remaining communities. Wei et al. [30]
proposed a measure which consider more information about community it-
self, and used non-linear weighted function to combine these factors. Aniko
et al. [31] proposed a topological index (distance-based fragmentation) to
quantify the structural vulnerability in plant-visitation network. Alim et al.
[32] assessed the community vulnerability through social-based forwarding
and routing methods in opportunistic networks, which shows significant con-
tribution about some devices on the performance of entire network. Che et
al. [33] modified original evolution method, and proposed a nondimension-
alized scoring standard to form a complete assessment system to measure
the vulnerability of urban power grid. Chen et al. [34] explored the rela-
tionship between vulnerability of complex network and fractal dimension.
These methods have their own limitations, like computational complexity,
inaccurate measurements, and not suitable for certain scenarios.
Since entropy is an useful tool to measure the uncertain of information
[35, 36], it has been wildly in the network theory, like dimension presenta-
tion [37–39], evidence theory [40, 41], influential nodes identification [42, 43],
time series prediction [44, 45]. In addition, the structure and property of
communities can be expressed by probability sets, entropy-based method
has gradually been an reasonable and effective method to quantify the prop-
erty of network [46, 47]. Therefore, an entropy approach is applied in this
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paper to measure the vulnerability of community which can overcome the
shortcomings and limitations of previous method.
In this paper, an entropy-based measure is proposed to quantify the vulner-
ability degree of community structure. This proposed method can combine
two parts of information, i.e., internal factors and external factors, which can
consider more information about community and give a reasonable vulnera-
bility result of each community. The internal factors contains the number of
edges inside the community and the complexity degree of community which is
measured by Tsallis structure entropy, and the external factors contains the
number of edges outside the community and the similarity degree between
chosen community and other communities which is measured by relative en-
tropy. These two entropy can quantify the property of community more
reasonable and effective. Finally, the vulnerability and relative vulnerability
result can be obtained by this proposed method to quantitatively describe
vulnerability of different community. In order to show the performance and
effectiveness of this proposed method, one example network and three real-
world complex network are applied in this paper. In addition, the sensitive
of four weight factors are analysed by Sobol’ indices in Manzi network, and
the vulnerability order obtained by different method are compared in Italian
380KV power grid network. The experiments results show the superiority and
reasonableness of this proposed method, meanwhile, this proposed method
can overcome the shortcomings and limitations of previous method,
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents
some basic properties about node and detecting community methods. This
novel entropy-based method is proposed in Section 3 to measure the vul-
nerability of community. Meanwhile, numerical experiments are performed
to illustrate the reasonableness and effectiveness of the proposed method in
4
Section 4. Conclusion is conducted in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, some basic concepts about complex network are introduced.
In addition, a community detection algorithm and classical community vul-
nerability measure are described in this section.
2.1. Node properties in network
A given complex network can be denoted asG(N,E), whereN = (1, 2, · · · , n)
and E = (1, 2, · · · , m) is the set of nodes and edges respectively, and n and
m is the number of nodes and edges in the complex network respectively. A
is the adjacency matrix of complex network whose size is n×n, where aij = 1
represents there is an edge between node i and node j, and aij = 0 is the
opposite.
Definition 2.1. (Node Degree). The degree of node i in the complex network
is denoted as di and defined as follows,
di =
n∑
j=1
aij (1)
where aij is one element of adjacency matrix A. The degree distribution of
node i is defined as follows,
pi =
di∑
i∈N
di
(2)
Definition 2.2. (Node Betweenness). The betweenness distribution of node
i in the complex network is denoted as pi
′ and defined as follows,
pi
′ =
∑
s,e 6=i
gse(i)
gse
(3)
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where gse is the total number of shortest paths between node s and node e,
and gse(i) is the number of shortest paths between node s and node e which
pass through node i.
2.2. Community detection algorithm
Lots of measures have been proposed to detect the community structure
in complex network. In order to find the community structure of network,
Newman’s modularity method [48] is applied in this paper.
Definition 2.3. (Newman’s modularity). For a given complex network G
with k communities, the modularity is denoted as Q and defined as follows,
Q =
k∑
ck=1
(
eck
m
−
(
Degck
2m
)2)
(4)
where k is the number of communities, m is the total number of edges in
complex network, eck is the number of edges in community ck, and Degck is
the total degree of nodes in community ck which is defined as follows,
Degck =
∑
i∈ck
di (5)
where ck is the set of nodes in community, and di is the degree of node i.
The value of Q can measure the difference of different communities which
can show the presence of community structure in complex network. Differ-
ent value of Q represents different situation. Q = 0 means all of the nodes in
the network are in one single community and there is no community struc-
ture in the network. Q > 0 represents there are some kinds of community
structure, and Q = 1 means the community structure is strong in the net-
work. Meanwhile, Newman and Girvan [49] suggested the value of Q should
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fall in the range 0.2 ∼ 0.7, and this value of Q would show the existence of
community structures.
The main idea of this method is to find the changes in Q, and the step to
detect community structure is shown as follows,
Step 1: Each node in the complex network is divided in a single community.
Step 2: Every two communities are integrated into one community in turn,
and the value of modularity change ∆Qij can obtained from the community
structure.
Step 3: Community i and community j are integrated into one community
with the highest ∆Qij .
Step 4: Repeat Step 2 and Step 3 until ∆Qij < 0.
2.3. Classical community vulnerability measure
To measure the vulnerability of community, lots of measures have been pro-
posed. One classical measure is introduced in this section.
Definition 2.4. (Community vulnerability measure). The vulnerability of
community x is denoted as vx and defined as follows,
vx =
1
|Vx|
, ∀Vx 6= ∅ (6)
where Vx is the set of communities which are connected with community x,
and |Vx| is the number of links which are connected with community x.
The relative vulnerability of community x is denoted as Rx and defined as
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follows,
Rx =
vx
v
, v = min
y
(vy) (7)
3. The proposed method
3.1. Basic method
In this section, a novel method is proposed to measure community vulner-
ability via entropy approach. This proposed method focuses two parts of
information which can consider more details in the network, including inter-
nal factors and external factors. The internal factors include the complexity
degree of community and number of edges within the community, and exter-
nal factors include the similarity degree and number of edges between chosen
community and other communities. The complexity and similarity would be
obtained by entropy method which would overcome the shortcomings and
limitations of previous method. The flow chart of this proposed method is
shown in Fig. 1.
3.1.1. Complexity measure
Firstly, the complexity degree of community is measured by Tsallis structure
entropy which combines the degree distribution and betweenness distribu-
tion. Because degree distribution focuses on the local topological information
of central node and betweenness distribution considers the global topological
information, Tsallis structure entropy which combines these two topological
information can give a reasonable measure for community complexity.
Definition 3.1. (Complexity measure based on Tsallis structure entropy).
The complexity degree of community ck is denoted as Tck and defined as
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Fig. 1: The flow chart of this proposed method.
follows,
Tck =
|ck|∑
i=1
pi
qi − pi
1− qi
(8)
where |ck| is the number of nodes in community ck, pi is the degree distribution
node i which can be obtained by Eq. (2), qi can be obtained from betweenness
distribution, and the relationship between qi and pi
′ is shown as follows,
qi = 1 + (pmax
′ − pi
′) (9)
where pi
′ can be obtained from Eq. (3), pmax
′ is the maximum value of be-
tweenness pi
′. The purpose of Eq. (9) is to make the index qi bigger than 1
which can show the influence of subnetwork to community ck.
When each node’s qi equals to 1, Tsallis entropy would degenerate to Shannon
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entropy which is shown as follows,
Tck = −
|ck|∑
i=1
pi log pi (10)
This form of entropy would only focuses on the local topological structure
information.
The degree distribution is based on the local topological structure around
central node i. The betweenness distribution focuses on the whole topologi-
cal structure which can describe the global properties of community. Most of
time, qi would be bigger than 1 which can show the influence of subnetwork.
When each nodes’s qi equals to 1, the Tsallis entropy would degenerate to
Shannon entropy based on degree distribution which only focuses on the local
structure. Using betweenness distribution to replace the constant parameter
q can describe the information about the network itself which is more rea-
sonable for measuring the communities’ complexity. This method’s property
also obeys the classical Tsallis entropy.
3.1.2. Similarity measure
Then, relative entropy is used in this section to obtain the similarity de-
gree of chosen community and other communities. The relative entropy
(Kullback−Leibler divergence) was wildly used in information theory and
probability theory which is proposed by Kullback and Leibler et al. [50]. In
general, the relative entropy is used to measure the difference between two
probability set. In this section, the relative entropy is based on Shannon
entropy and degree distribution which can measure the similarity between
two community structure.
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For two community ci and cj, the community structure is denoted as Lci(Ni, Di)
and Lcj(Nj , Dj) respectively, where Ni and Di is the set of nodes and set of
degree of nodes in community ci. |Ni| is the number of nodes in commu-
nity ci and max |Ni| is the maximum size of community in the network. The
probability set of community i is denoted as P (i) and obtained by degree dis-
tribution. The scale of every probability set s would be same which equals
to max |Ni|. So the probability set of community ci can be shown as follows,
P (i) = [p(i, 1), p(i, 2), · · · , p(i, s)] (11)
The element in probability set is based on degree distribution. When the
size |Ni| of community ci equals to max |Ni|, all of the elements would be
obtained by nodes’ degree, but when |Ni| < max |Ni|, some elements would
equal to zero to make the probability set complete. The detail of p(i, k) is
defined as follows,
p(i, k) =


dk
|Ni|∑
k=1
dk
k ≤ |Ni|
0 k > |Ni|
(12)
where dk is the degree of node k, |Ni| is the number of nods in community
ci.
To measure the similarity between community ci and cj , the relative entropy
is used in this section and it is defined as follows,
Definition 3.2. (Similarity measure based on relative entropy). The differ-
ence between two communities is obtained by relative entropy Rij and defined
as follows,
Rij(P
′(i)||P ′(j)) =
s′∑
k=1
p′(i, k) log
p′(i, k)
p′(j, k)
(13)
Because the order of element would affect the relative entropy and similarity
result, p′(i, k) and p′(j, k) are the decreasing order of p(i, k) and p(j, k) in
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Eq. (11). s′ can be obtained as follows,
s′ = min(|Ni| , |Nj |) (14)
The adjustment of s′ is to avoid p
′(i,k)
p′(j,k)
being 0 or positive infinity, which would
be beneficial for calculation. The relative entropy’ property is not symmetry,
so the following changes are needed to make it symmetrical,
rij = Rij(P
′(i)||P ′(j)) +Rji(P
′(j)||P ′(i)) (15)
Thus, rij = rji holds, and the relative entropy between two communities are
symmetry. Because the relative entropy measure the difference between two
probability set, the difference between two communities are obtained in this
situation. The bigger rij, the greater the difference between two communities
structure is. So the similarity index is obtained based on relative entropy to
show the similarity between two communities, and it is denoted as sij and
defined as follows,
sij = 1−
rij
max(rij)
(16)
where sij is also symmetry, and shows the similarity between two communities
structure. The more similar the two communities, the less the difference
between them is, the closer rij is to max(rij) and the closer sij is to zero.
So the similarity between two communities structure can be measured by
the relative entropy, which can give a novel approach to this problem. The
relative entropy focuses on the local structure topological information in the
community structure, which is more reasonable.
3.1.3. Edges in the network
The number of edges inside and outside the community are also important
for community vulnerability measuring. In this section, the number of edges
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is considered.
Definition 3.3. (Number of edges inside the community). The number of
edges inside the community ck is donated as D
in
ck
and defined as follows,
Dinck =
∑
i∈ck
∑
j∈ck
aij (17)
where node i and node j are within the community ck, aij is the element of
adjacency matrix A. Thus, aij is entirely inside the community.
Definition 3.4. (Number of edges outside the community). The number of
edges outside the community ck is donated as D
out
ck
and defined as follows,
Doutck =
∑
i∈ck
∑
j /∈ck
aij (18)
where node i is within the community ck, and node j is outside the community
ck, aij is the element of adjacency matrix A. Thus, aij connects the chosen
community and other communities which can show the relationship between
them.
3.1.4. Community vulnerability measure
Lastly, all of the factors defined in Definition 3.1 to 3.4 are considered in the
vulnerability measuring model. This proposed method would consider the in-
ternal factors and external factors which consider more details of community,
and is defined as follows,
Definition 3.5. (Proposed community vulnerability measure). The vulnera-
bility of community x is donated as V ulx and defined as follows,
V ulx =
(Sx)
α
(Doutx )
β
1
(Dinx )
λ(Tx)
η
(19)
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where α, β, λ, η are the weight factors of different parameters, and all of them
are bigger than zero. Dinx and D
out
x is the number of edges inside and out-
side the community x respectively, Tx is the complexity degree of community
x, and Sx represents the similarity degree between community x and other
communities (exclude community x itself) which can be shown as follows,
Sx =
k∑
j=1
sxj, j 6= x (20)
where sxj can be obtained by Eq. (16)
The relative vulnerability of community x is denoted as RVx and defined as
follows,
RVx =
V ulx
V ul
, V ul = min
y
(V uly) (21)
In order for these parameters to be considered on the same scale, all of
these four parameters sxj, D
out
x , D
in
x , Tx are normalized firstly. The weight
factors α, β, λ, η can give the weight to consider different parameters, which
can be adjusted in different situation. This setting of weight factor makes
this proposed method more reasonable. Some special cases of this proposed
method V ulx are shown as follows,
1) When α=β=λ=η, this four parameters are considered equally.
2)When β=1, and α=λ=η=0, this proposed method V ulx would degenerate
to the classical vulnerability measure vx in Eq. (6).
3) When α=β= 0, this proposed method V ulx would consider the external
factors, which is the communities connected with chosen community.
4) When λ=η=0, this proposed method V ulx would only consider the inter-
nal factors, i.e., the chosen community.
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3.2. Sensitive analysis
Because these four weight factors (α, β, λ, η) are important for community
vulnerability measuring, and the vulnerability result would have a related
changes as weight factors change, thus, how to determine factors has been a
problem in this model. In this section, the sensitive of these weight factors are
analysed. In general, the global sensitivity analysis ia a useful tool to obtain
the influence of inputs on the output variability in mathematical and physical
model, and Sobol’ indices based on variance decomposition is applied in this
paper. The first-order Sobol’ index SI(Xi) and total effect index ST (Xi) are
defined as follows respectively,
SI(Xi) =
V arXi(EX∼i(Y |Xi ))
V ar(Y )
(22)
ST (Xi) =
EX∼i(V arXi(Y |X∼i ))
V ar(Y )
(23)
where Y represents the output of system, Xi is the ith independent input X ,
X∼i is all of the inputs exclude Xi, V ar(Y ) is the variance which change with
these inputs. The first-order Sobol’ index SI(i) can get the contribution ofXi
to Y , and total effect index ST (i) can get the contribution to the variance of
Y by the variability of each input Xi, which considering its individual effects
and the interaction with other variables.
Each weight factors are randomly generated 10000 times by Monte Carlo
method, and the range fall into [0.2, 5]. The vulnerability result would
be obtained by these random factor combinations, and the contribution of
different weight factors can be obtained by first-order Sobol’ index and total
effect index.
15
9 8
76
4 5
3
1 2
A
B
C
Fig. 2: An example network with 9 nodes.
3.3. An illustrative example
In this section, an example network is given to show the difference between
this proposed method V ulx and classical measure vx. The network structure
is shown in Fig. 2. Observing from Fig. 2, this network has 9 nodes and
14 edges, and the community structure of network is detected by Newman’s
modularity in Eq. (4). The network is divided into three communities (Q =
0.2857) and each of the community is a fully-connected subnetwork. All of
these four weight factors α, β, λ, η equal to one which make four parameters
equally important. According to this proposed method in Eq. (19), (21) and
classical measure in Eq. (6), (7), four parameters and the vulnerability of
three communities are shown in Table 1.
From Table 1 when α=β=λ=η= 1, it can be found that the vulnerability of
community C is the lowest, which is the same as the classical measure, but
the vulnerability of community A and B is different with classical measure.
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Table 1: The vulnerability of three communities in example network in Fig. 2.
Community Sx Tx D
in
x D
out
x |Vx| V ulx RVx vx Rx
Community A 1 0.5 0.1667 0.5 0.5 24 27.6264 2 2
Community B 0.4298 0.7924 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.1696 2.4975 2 2
Community C 0.8687 1 1 1 1 0.8687 1 1 1
It can be found from Table 1 that the classical measure of the vulnerability
vx of community A and B is same and it is 2 because of the same num-
ber of edges outside of chosen community. However, this classical method
is not reasonable, because the vulnerability of one chosen community is de-
termined not only by external factors but also by internal factors. From
Fig. 2, community A is a fully-connected subnetwork with only two nodes,
but community B is a fully-connected subnetwork with three nodes. When
the network’ structure is similar, i.e., fully-connected, the network with more
nodes would be more robust, so community B is more robust than community
A. The similar vulnerability result can be obtained by this proposed method
(V ulB = 2.1696 < V ulC = 24), which is more reasonable for real-world
application. The relative vulnerability RVx can be more obvious to show
the vulnerability difference between different community. From the compar-
ison result of example network, this proposed vulnerability measure V ulx
outperforms classical method, and can distinguish the vulnerability level of
community that the classical method cannot distinguish.
4. Experimental study
In this section, three real-world complex networks are applied to show the
performance and effectiveness of this proposed method. These three net-
works are namely as Manzi network [51], Karate network [52], Italian power
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Table 2: The topological properties of real-world complex networks.
Network n m 〈k〉 kmax 〈d〉 dmax
Manzi 52 76 2.8077 5 5.5000 13
Karate 34 78 4.5882 17 2.4082 5
Italian 127 171 2.6929 7 8.5682 25
network [53] respectively. The topological properties of these three networks
are shown in Table 2. Observing from Table 2, n and m is the number of
nodes and edges respectively. 〈k〉 and kmax is the average and maximum
value of degree respectively, and 〈d〉 and dmax is the average and maximum
value of shortest distance respectively in the network.
4.1. Manzi network
Firstly, the telephone network in Belgium [51] which was analyzed for re-
liability purposes is used in this section. The topological structure of this
network and the community structure obtained by Newman’s modularity [48]
is shown in Fig. 3. Observing from Fig. 3, Manzi network is divided into
seven communities (Q = 0.6316), and the detail nodes in each community is
shown in Table 3.
The vulnerability of each community can guide the identification of critical
community in the network. The vulnerability V ulx and relative vulnerability
RVx of each community are given in Table 4, the classical comparing vul-
nerability measure vx and Rx are also shown in Table 4. Observing classical
measure Rx in Table 4, community 7 is the most vulnerable community, but
community 3 is the most robust community in the network. The vulnerability
of the rest of community (community 1, 2, 4, 5, 6) cannot be identified by the
classical measure because of the same value of Rx. Thus, this novel method
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Community 7
Community 5
Community 3
Fig. 3: Manzi et al. network [51].
is proposed based on two parts of information, including internal factors and
external factors. The result of this proposed method (V ulx, RVx) are shown
in Table 4. It can be found that community 3 is also the most robust com-
munity in the network which is same as the classical method. The value of
RVx in community 4 and community 7 is close, which are more vulnerable
than other communities. The rest of communities can get close but different
RVx, which can give a vulnerable order of this community (community 6
> community 5 > community 2 > community 1). The vulnerable order of
community in the network is community 4 > community 7 > community 6
> community 5 > community 2 > community 1 > community 3. So this
proposed method can consider more information in the network and give
a detail vulnerable order for these communities which can overcome some
limitations of classical method.
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Table 3: The community details of Manzi network.
community k Nodes in community k
1 3,6,7,8,9,10,13
2 1,2,4,5,11,12,14
3 15,16,17,18,20,21,24,25,29,31
4 19,22,26
5 23,38,30,32,36,37,41,43
6 27,33,34,35,38,39,40,42,45,46,47,49,50
7 44,48,51,52
Table 4: The vulnerability of communities in Manzi network.
Community Sx Tx D
in
x D
out
x |Vx| V ulx RVx vx Rx
1 0.3518 0.6864 0.4210 0.6667 0.6667 1.8260 1.8775 1.5 1.5
2 0.3529 0.7909 0.3684 0.6667 0.6667 1.8170 1.8682 1.5 1.5
3 0.4783 0.9344 0.5263 1 1 0.9725 1 1 1
4 1 0.5447 0.1578 0.6667 0.6667 17.4406 17.9322 1.5 1.5
5 0.4139 0.8814 0.4210 0.6667 0.6667 1.6730 1.7202 1.5 1.5
6 0.7654 1 1 0.6667 0.6667 1.1482 1.1805 1.5 1.5
7 0.6429 0.5915 0.2105 0.3333 0.3333 15.4872 15.9238 3 3
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Then, Sobol’ indices introduced in Section 3.2 is used in this section to anal-
ysis the global sensitivity of these four weight factor α, β, λ, η. These weight
factors can adjust the consideration of different parameters which can give a
different vulnerability result. The sensitivity analysis result for the vulnera-
bility of different community with different weight factors are shown in Table
5. Some conclusions can be obtained as follows,
1) The value of first-order Sobol’ index can show the sensitivity of different
wight factors. For instance, the vulnerability of community 1 is most sensitive
to weight factor α, followed by λ, the other two factors β and η are less
sensitive.
2) When the parameters of community equals to one, the first-order Sobol’
index and total effect index would equal to 1. That is because no matter how
weight factor change, the influence parameter would remain the same, i.e.,
equal to 1. For example, Tx and D
in
x equal to 1 in community 6, so SI(η),
ST (η), SI(λ) and ST (λ) equal to 0. Thus, the variability of these two weight
factors would not affect the vulnerability measure of community 6. The same
situation can occur in Sx of community 4 and D
out
x of community 3.
3) In most of communities, the first-order Sobol’ index SI(β) and SI(η) are
smaller than SI(α) and SI(λ), which means the vulnerability measure of
community is more sensitive with α and λ. The similarity degree and the
number of edges within community are more influential to the vulnerability
results.
4) The first-order Sobol’ index SI(β), SI(λ), SI(η) would be smaller when
the value of parameters Tx, D
in
x , and D
out
x are bigger, and SI(α) is different
situation which is bigger with bigger parameters Sx. The situation occurs
because V ulx is positively correlated with Sx, but negatively correlated with
21
Table 5: The sensitivity analysis results of the vulnerability of communities in
Manzi network with different weight factors.
Community SI(α) ST (α) SI(β) ST (β) SI(λ) ST (λ) SI(η) ST (η)
1 0.2055 0.7504 0.0529 0.2604 0.1570 0.5644 0.0294 0.2394
2 0.1983 0.7288 0.0509 0.2655 0.1941 0.6308 0.0114 0.1070
3 0.3969 0.6861 0 0 0.3116 0.5945 0.0044 0.0124
4 0 0 0.0253 0.2524 0.4246 0.8596 0.0883 0.4478
5 0.2229 0.6721 0.0650 0.2812 0.2247 0.6074 0.0048 0.0345
6 0.2895 0.3756 0.6343 0.7163 0 0 0 0
7 0.0275 0.3536 0.0966 0.6666 0.1579 0.7105 0.0374 0.3531
Tx, D
in
x , and D
out
x . Hence the value trend of these parameters would have
different impact on the vulnerability of communities. These patterns can be
observed from all of these communities vulnerability sensitivity analysis in
Table 5.
5) The sum of the first-order Sobol’ index over these four weight factors in
different communities are less than 1, which means there is an interaction
between these four parameters. But this situation does not occur in total
effect index.
6) Because of the interaction between these parameters, there would be a
huge difference between first-order Sobol’ index and total effect index. But
it is interesting to find that the order of total effect index would be the same
as first-order Sobol’ index. For instance, the order of first-order Sobol’ index
in community 1 is SI(η) < SI(β) < SI(λ) < SI(α), the order of total effect
index is ST (η) < ST (β) < ST (λ) < ST (α), which is same as previous order.
22
Table 6: The community details of Karate network.
community k Nodes in community k
1 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 22
2 9, 15, 16, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34
Because Sobol’ indices is convenient to obtained, and similar results can be
obtained from differen network, we only analyse the sensitivity of weight
factors in Manzi network and don’t analyse the subsequent network.
4.2. Karate network
Next, a social network is used in this section to show the performance of this
proposed method. This social network is named as Karate club network,
which describes the relationship between 34 members of one club in US uni-
versity [52]. The topological structure and community structure divided by
Newman’s modularity is shown in Fig. 4. Every nodes in the network denote
a member in karate club, including the instructors and administrators, and
the edges in the network represent the relationship between two members
beyond their normal activities in the club. The network is divided into two
communities (Q = 0.38), and it is same as the well-known community struc-
ture result because there has been disagreement between administrators and
instructors [52]. The detail member in each communities is shown in Table
6, and it can be found that the members are divided equally and each com-
munity have 17 members. The leader in each community is node 1 and node
34 respectively because of their largest degree.
The vulnerability measure result of Karate network is shown in Table 7. Be-
cause there is only two communities, it can be found that the external factors
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Community 1
Community 2
Fig. 4: Karate club network [52].
(Sx, D
out
x ) are determined by each other, and they are the same. Thus, the
classical measure Rx would obtain same result and cannot identify the vul-
nerability degree of each community. But the internal factors are determined
by community itself, these parameters can get a different result. It is inter-
esting to find that the number of edges inside the community Dinx is also same
and it is 34, but the edges between nodes are different which result in a dif-
ferent complexity degree. The complexity degree Tx of two communities are
0.7060 and 1 respectively, which would get a different vulnerability measure
for different communities. The relative vulnerability RVx of each communi-
ties are 1.4162 and 1 respectively, which can get conclusion that community
1 is more vulnerable than community 2. The main reason for their different
vulnerability result is the complexity degree of each community, and the ini-
tial reason is the topological structure of each community. From this case,
we can find that the vulnerability cannot be distinguished when the number
of communities is too small. The topological structure inside the commu-
nity is also important for the vulnerability result, and more factors should
be considered to make a accurate identification for their vulnerability. So
this proposed method can get a reasonable vulnerability comparison result
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Table 7: The vulnerability of communities in Karate network.
Community Sx Tx D
in
x D
out
x |Vx| V ulx RVx vx Rx
1 1 0.7060 1 1 1 1.4162 1.4162 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
in Karate club network, whereas, the classical method Rx can only get the
same vulnerability for two communities.
4.3. Italian 380KV power grid
Lastly, the Italian 380KV power transmission grid network [53] is used in
this section. This network has been frequently used to analyse the network
vulnerability performance. The topological structure and community struc-
ture is shown in Fig. 5. Observing from Fig. 5, this network is divided into
10 communities (Q = 0.7596), and different communities have different num-
ber of components and the detail is shown in Table 8. It can be found that
community 9 and community 7 have the maximum and minimum number of
components respectively.
The vulnerability results are shown in Table 9. In this network, a novel
method which is proposed by Wei et al. [30] is used as a comparing method,
this method is also modified from Ref [29]. The detail parameters and vul-
nerability results of communities are shown in Table 9. Observing from Table
9, community 5 is the most robust community from RVx and Rx, but R
′
x
give a result that community 7 is the most robust. Community 7 only have
6 nodes which is the minimum number of nodes, so this conclusion (com-
munity 7 is the most robust) have low credibility, and it can be also seen
from these four parameters (Sx, Tx, D
in
x , D
out
x ) in Table 9. Community 10
is consider to be the most vulnerable from these three methods at the same
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Fig. 5: Italian 380KV power grid network [53].
Table 8: The community details of Italian 380KV power network.
community k Nodes in community k
1 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 20, 19
2 37, 38, 36, 39, 35, 32, 60, 33, 31, 30, 34, 42
3 57, 56, 52, 49, 50, 47, 46, 45, 43, 44, 51, 54, 55
4 10, 16, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, 26, 25, 28, 29, 27, 23, 59, 58
5 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 71, 40, 41, 66, 68, 70, 53, 48, 69
6 77, 78, 81, 74, 75, 79, 82, 76, 72, 14, 73
7 83, 84, 85, 86, 101, 100
8 102, 110, 111, 115, 120, 113, 117, 118, 116, 114, 112
9 119, 109, 107, 108, 106, 104, 103, 105, 97, 99, 98, 88, 87, 96, 91, 95, 80, 92, 90, 93, 94, 89
10 122, 123, 121, 126, 125, 124, 127
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time. This proposed method would magnify the vulnerability of community,
like the relative vulnerability of propose method RVx = 43.8623 and other
method Rx = 8, R
′
x = 11.4347. The RVx of most vulnerable community
would be much bigger than other methods, which is convenient to find the
vulnerability of community. Meanwhile, the classical method cannot identify
some communities’ vulnerability, such as community 2, 4, 6 and commu-
nity 1, 3, 7, 8, because of the same Rx. This proposed method and Wei et
al. method can get a certain vulnerability order for these communities (2,
4, 6 and 1, 3, 7, 8). The detail vulnerability orders of these communities
obtained by different methods are shown in Table 10. From these orders,
it can be found that the order obtained by this proposed method is more
similar with classical method than Wei method. Specifically, community 9 is
considered as the second to last vulnerable community in classical method
and proposed method, but it is considered as second vulnerable community
by Wei method. Community 3, 7, 8 is considered as the second vulnerable
community by classical method at the same time, and this proposed method
give a conclusion that community 7, 8, 3 is the second, third, forth vulnera-
ble community respectively which is similar with classical method, but Wei
method gives a dissimilar order. Other more detail information about the
vulnerability order of communities can be obtained from Table 10. So this
proposed method would consider more information of community and give a
certain vulnerability order, and is more reasonable than other methods.
5. Conclusion
The vulnerability measuring of community has already been a hot topic in
the study of network theory. In this paper, a new entropy-based method
is proposed to measure the vulnerability of communities which can over-
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Table 9: The vulnerability of communities in Italian 380KV power network.
Community Sx Tx D
in
x D
out
x |Vx| V ulx RVx vx Rx v
′
x [30] R
′
x [30]
1 0.3469 0.9205 0.5161 0.3750 0.3750 1.9470 1.9444 2.6667 2.6667 9.1020 2.6547
2 0.4055 0.7882 0.4193 0.6250 0.6250 1.9629 1.9603 1.6000 1.6000 5.0539 1.4741
3 0.4675 0.8954 0.4838 0.3750 0.3750 2.8773 2.8734 2.6667 2.6667 6.9333 2.0222
4 0.5951 0.8733 0.6129 0.6250 0.6250 1.7789 1.7765 1.6000 1.6000 5.6606 1.651
5 0.4661 0.8017 0.5806 1 1 1.0013 1 1 1 4.0843 1.1912
6 0.4017 0.7588 0.4193 0.6250 0.6250 2.0198 2.0171 1.6000 1.6000 3.4459 1.005
7 1 0.4891 0.2258 0.3750 0.3750 24.1426 24.1102 2.6667 2.6667 3.4286 1
8 0.4114 0.8543 0.3870 0.3750 0.3750 3.3173 3.3128 2.6667 2.6667 8.5554 2.4953
9 0.7848 1 1 0.7500 0.7500 1.0465 1.0451 1.3333 1.3333 9.5387 2.7821
10 0.7305 0.6875 0.1935 0.1250 0.1250 43.9213 43.8623 8 8 39.2052 11.4347
Table 10: The vulnerability order of Italian 380KV power network by different
method.
Method Vulnerability order
Classical [29] Community 5 < 9 < 2 = 4 = 6 < 1 = 3 = 7 = 8 < 10
Proposed Community 5 < 9 < 4 < 1 < 2 < 6 < 3 < 8 < 7 < 10
Wei et al. [30] Community 7 < 6 < 5 < 2 < 4 < 3 < 8 < 1 < 9 < 10
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come the shortcomings and limitations of previous methods. Different with
previous method, this proposed method combines the internal factors and
external factors of community which give sufficient consideration of commu-
nity information. Thus, reasonable vulnerability result can be obtained by
this proposed method. The internal factors contain the number of edges
inside community and the complexity degree of community measured by
Tsallis structure entropy, and the external factors contain the number of
edges outside community and the similarity degree between chosen commu-
nity and other communities measured by relative entropy. The vulnerability
and relative vulnerability of community are obtained to give the quantitative
description of vulnerability of community eventually. In order to show the
performance and effectiveness of this proposed method, one example network
and three real-world complex network are applied. Through the vulnerabil-
ity order obtained by different methods, the rationality of this method is
demonstrated. In addition, the sensitivity of weight factors are analysed by
Sobol’ indices, the important parameters considered in this model can be
obtained. The experiment results show the superiority and reasonableness of
this propose method.
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